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L. HABER AND R. N. HABER experiential expert's subjective, individual conclusion is offered without a probability of accuracy attached because that probability is unknown and, in the case of an individual, subjective judgement, unknowable. With this approach to expertise, Mnookin properly argues that the kind of validity testing we outlined is excessive, and does not need to be done.
This kind of expertise is at the heart of the decision Judge Pollock made in Plaza 1 (USA v. LleraPlaza, 2001 ), which he then reversed as follows (USA v. Llera-Plaza, 2002) : a fingerprint examiner could testify from experience, but was not permitted to offer a probability that she was correct.
In contrast, someone who testifies on the basis of scientific expertise offers a demonstration that the method used to reach her conclusion has been shown to achieve a known level of accuracy (its validity). The scientific expert assures the court of the accuracy of the testimony offered through reliance on a body of quantitative knowledge that has been assessed against ground truth. As an individual, she demonstrates to the court that her training and experience are adequate to apply and interpret that body of knowledge to the instant case.
Fingerprint examiners who testify in Daubert courts, and the Daubert courts themselves, straddle an untenable line between these two kinds of experts. A typical examiner testifies (1) based on her experience and training, (2) she is 100% certain of her identification conclusion and (3) her conclusion is based on an application of the infallible, virtually error-free, ACE-V comparison method. The first part of this expertise is experientially justified, the second part applies to neither kind of expertise and the third part refers to the application of a scientifically validated method, a scientific expertise.
A typical Daubert court, when it has reviewed the admissibility of fingerprint evidence based on the ACE-V method, has accepted the straddle. The courts have listened to examiners testify about the ACE-V method. Examiners testifying in court agree among themselves about the method (though the agreement is not unanimous, as is shown in Triplett & Cooney, 2006) , they agree among themselves as to what they do and they agree among themselves on how accurately they do it. The courts have accepted this experiential agreement as sufficient to meet the Daubert requirements. This is the case even though the Daubert courts have not evaluated evidence of validity of the ACE-V method, as if validity is shown by agreement 'among examiners', and not agreement 'with ground truth'.
Fingerprint experts claim under oath and in print that what the testimony examiners provide is based on scientific expertise, using a method capable of justifying their conclusions with an extremely small known error rate. In the Inspector General's report following the Mayfield erroneous identification (Fine, 2006) , the FBI defined the method they used as the ACE-V, described its four component steps and repeated the claims that it was a validated scientific method with a (near) zero error rate. As long as the courts, as well as the profession, accept these claims, scientists like ourselves will continue to object, and Mnookin's very interesting suggestion is moot. Mnookin (2007) offers another way to get around experimental validity testing. She observes that although there is no formal validity test of ACE-V, there is a roughly 100-year long, extremely informal 'natural experiment' through its use. According to Mnookin, whenever a latent print examiner matches a latent and independent evidence at trial links the suspect to the crime, the latent print examiner's identification has been corroborated. While no precise probability of accuracy can be assessed this way, she feels it does permit the court to assume an acceptably high accuracy level.
We disagree. In natural experiments, there is no known ground truth. There is no evidence that the corroborative evidence is independent. There is no evidence that the latent print examiner used ACE-V (or any other procedure, protocol, method or eye-brain). The number of cases in which corroborative evidence is correct (and independent) is unknown and unknowable. Finally, Altschuler (2005) reported that 90% of the felony cases in this country are not tried, but handled through plea bargains, which are evidence of neither accuracy nor guilt. In short, Mnookin's informal natural experiment yields no more data about comparison accuracy than the fact that fingerprint evidence has been in use for 100 years.
We turn to Champod's (2007) suggestion that examiners should testify to the probability of an accurate identification, and not with 100% certainty. While we, Cole and Mnookin strongly concur on scientific principles, Champod is concerned with the statistical probability of a chance match between two different fingers. Champod (2007; Champod et al., 2004) argues that regardless of the validity of the ACE-V method to support conclusions, without research on the features contained in friction ridge skin, there can be no way to determine the chances that two patterns could be mistaken for each other. The population statistics for the co-occurrences among DNA patterns has been well-documented (Thompson, 1997) , and Champod wants comparable data for friction ridge skin. We have serious questions about this research.
Conclusions based on probability versus certainty

Which features should be analysed?
Champod (2007) believes that the proper assessment embraces the systematic and statistical investigation of the relationships among friction ridge skin, and cites Neumann et al. (2006 Neumann et al. ( , 2007 and Egli et al. (2006) , who show very limited configurations of minutiae leading to coincident match probabilities of about one in a billion. However, Langenburg (2004) found that examiners disagreed in determining the number of minutiae present in relatively good quality latents. This suggests that minutiae, such as ridge endings and bifurcations, may not be the best features to use. Whether Ashbaugh's (2005) ridges in sequence produce better examiner agreement on the occurrence of features in latents needs to be tested. Before the kind of much-needed research suggested by Champod can be performed, the fingerprint profession and researchers need to identify and validate which features in latent fingerprints to use for comparisons with known prints.
Statistical modelling of features in latent prints
Fingerprint comparison, when used as a tool for forensic identification, relies on several assumptions, including the assumptions that the fingerprint pattern on every individual finger is unique and, further, is distinguishable from the patterns on all other fingers. Arguments to support the first assumption have relied on the evidence about the embryological development of friction ridge skin (Ashbaugh, 1999) . Forensic fingerprint comparison in practice examines not 3D friction ridge skin but 2D poor quality images of unknown origin, which then are compared to 2D images of known donor skin. Champod (2007) would provide more relevant and very powerful data were he to perform statistical analyses of the probability of chance identities among features on latent fingerprints. Latent fingerprints are the relevant targets: latent prints are compared to known inked prints, not fingers.
Impoverished latent fingerprints inherently involve a problem in need of statistical modelling. As clarity, quality and quantity decrease, the probability of coincident matches increases. Imagine an exemplar portrait photograph, taken full face in a good studio. The latent face examiner is presented with the notoriously poor quality photographs obtained from a surveillance camera. The several robbers in the latent photograph images are shown from behind or in quarter view. How accurately can the examiner match any of the poor latent photographs to the well-printed known print? What is the statistical probability of error as information content and detail decrease in the latent image, how many exemplars could that image match? Before this kind of much-needed research can be performed, the fingerprint profession and researchers need to identify and validate which features to use for fingerprint comparisons, and then establish a validated metric of latent print difficulty. Difficulty could be used to predict the probability of chance co-occurrences.
Probability and certainty
We have drawn an implication from Champod (2007) that he wants examiners to testify to a combined probability given by the population co-occurrence likelihood and the validity of the method they are using to justify their conclusion. If that is the case, then we are in complete agreement (as long as he uses probabilities of co-occurrences among features of latent fingerprints). To do this, the validity of the ACE-V method must be assessed. Champod comments that ACE-V is not transparent in its steps. That transparency is necessary if it is to be testable for validity. In its absence, Champod's statistical modelling does not offer a solution for the fingerprint profession.
Automated fingerprint identification
Mnookin (2007) observes that if the ACE-V method is transformed to meet our demands, it would become algorithmic, like a computer program, from which human examiners could be excluded.
The move towards automaticity has been underway for 30 years with the advent of automated search systems and automated fingerprint readers for security systems. As far as we know, the fingerprint profession does not view these developments with alarm. They should. Consider five hazards.
First, a number of fingerprint laboratories (as well as security systems) today compare 10 prints to 10 prints entirely by computer. The process is called 'lights out'. No examiner intervenes or checks the conclusion. Anecdotal estimates of percent accuracy have been reported in the very high 90%. Today, computers are making fingerprint identifications.
Second, AFIS is used to compare crime scene latent fingerprints to suspect 10 prints when there is no suspect to compare. So far, despite its misleading name (automated fingerprint 'identification' system, emphasis ours), the programs are intended to produce likely candidates, not to identify suspects. Unfortunately, in practice, examiners sometimes act as if their computers can identify too. The typical output of an automated computer search is a set of candidate fingerprints, with an accompanying score, ranked from most to least similar to the input latent print. That score represents the amount of agreement between the latent and the exemplar in the database: loosely interpretable as being the probability of a correct match to the latent print. Missing is evidence that the rankings have a known validity, and the profession has not demanded such evidence from the manufacturers of the search systems. We have heard examiners, based on their testimony in court, misuse these rankings by focusing exclusively on higher-ranked candidates, as if the ranking and ground truth were highly correlated.
Third, a technician or examiner prepares the latent for submission to an automated search either by marking features or by tracing some ridge paths. If the search fails to produce a hit, the examiner may reanalyse the features of the latent and resubmit it for another search, as did the fingerprint examiner in Illinois v. Juan Luna, Criminal Court of Cook County, #02CR15430. The probability of an erroneous match increases steadily with each revision of the latent.
Fourth, many examiners report that they do not fully analyse the latent before submitting it to an automated search, waiting to do that until one or more of the candidates appear to be a possible match. This exposes the examiner to the known candidate prints before she has completed the analysis step, a dangerous source of bias. The Inspector General's report on the misidentification of Mayfield (Fine, 2006) documented that an examiner revised the features he had originally observed in the latent when he saw Mayfield's known print from AFIS.
Fifth, the algorithms used to make matches and to judge similarity in automated computer search systems are secrets closely guarded by the manufacturers of the systems. The systems are tested in house. The testing methods are another closely held secret. There is no known validity associated with the output of these automated searches. The danger of using such systems, in the absence of independent testing of their validity, seems as apparent to us as the danger of convicting a defendant on the basis of a fingerprint alone when there is no known probability of a comparison error. The fingerprint profession needs to recognize that the presence of the same issues of validity apply to comparison conclusions resulting from exemplars produced through a computer search and a suspect's exemplar produced from a police investigation. Similarly, the same issues of the dangers of exposure to bias apply, whether from knowledge of the computer ranking or in-house information about the suspect. Mnookin (2007) wants the fingerprint profession to implement quality-control mechanisms to reduce the likelihood of bias and observer effects, including procedures to require blind verification. She also recommends implementation of carefully designed, appropriately challenging proficiency tests. She points out that such measures would help assure the court of the reliability of fingerprint evidence, especially in the absence of evidence of validity.
The importance of quality controls and proficiency testing as complements to validity testing
Quality controls
The fingerprint profession, like the three commentators, recognizes that blind verification procedures and other quality controls are needed to minimize the risk of bias and observer effects (Stacey, 2004; Budowle et al., 2006; Fine, 2006) . We feel more optimistic than the commentators that improvements can and are being made.
Proficiency testing
We noted in our article that good proficiency tests of the kind proposed by Mnookin cannot be constructed until the profession creates a validated metric of latent print difficulty. In the absence of this metric, neither the equivalence of the test items nor the difficulty of test items can be established. That metric would also permit a standardized measure of latent print quality or difficulty that the profession could use to quantify the value/no-value standard, and it would permit powerful, difficulty-graded training materials, thereby improving training curricula.
Sources of erroneous conclusions
The courts need to know the probability of an erroneous conclusion to determine whether fingerprint evidence is sufficiently accurate to be admissible. The following six factors can each contribute to an erroneous identification: (1) the statistical probability of a coincidental match between a poor quality latent print and an innocent suspect's known print, (2) the extent to which the examiner interprets features that are ambiguous in the latent print, (3) the difficulty of the latent in its degree of clarity, quality and quantity, (4) the insufficient skill of the individual examiner, (5) the absence of good laboratory quality controls to prevent error and (6) the imprecision of the comparison method used to distinguish between one and two donors. The second source is not well-recognized in the fingerprint professional literature though it is very well-covered in the Office of the Inspector General's report (Fine, 2006) . The latent print examiner frequently starts the identification process with an extremely poor quality print, in which the features are indistinct. When the features are indistinct, the human examiner fills them in: a non-transparent process that is made transparent when a latent print is prepared for submission to an automated computer search. Whether the examiner draws some of the ridge paths or specifies some features and their locations, the result is an interpretation of the latent. We have seen, in several laboratories (e.g. Sheriff Department of King County, Washington, Crime Laboratory), examiners redraw a latent and resubmit it when the first search failed to produce a hit. This practice is an explicit interpretation and reinterpretation of which features are present in the stimulus latent. The extent to which reinterpreting a latent leads to error is unknown. The further interpretations are expected to have a higher error rate because the examiner is using versions of the stimulus of which she is less certain.
In an analogous way, when an examiner guesses the presence of a indistinct feature in a latent, if it then occurs in the exemplar, his guess is confirmed (e.g. when he asserts 'I thought this was a continuous ridge in the latent, but now I realize powder must have filled in the gap (because it was discontinuous in the known print)'). How many chance identifications can occur on this basis? If the examiner is permitted, on the basis of the exemplar, to reinterpret the features in the latent, the opportunities for error are obvious: the exemplar is being used to define the latent. One carefully documented instance is described in the Office of the Inspector General's analysis of the mistaken identification of Brandon Mayfield (Fine, 2006) . In the FBI examiner's first analysis of the latent associated with the Madrid bombing, he identified, by type and location, 10 features. After he saw Mayfield's exemplar, he changed the type of seven of these features (e.g. a ridge ending was now characterized as a bifurcation) to maximize agreement between the latent and the exemplar. When the correct perpetrator was found and his exemplar compared to the latent, it was determined that five of the seven changes made by the FBI examiner were wrong. This is precisely like a hit that is produced in a repeated AFIS resubmission.
Several prominent fingerprint examiners, including Ashbaugh (1999) and Champod et al. (2004) , are extremely sensitive to this problem. They resolve it by requiring the examiner to describe the latent completely before looking at the exemplar. Ashbaugh urges that the examiner documents ambiguous features in the latent in bench notes prior to viewing the exemplar. Other prominent examiners, such as Triplett & Cooney (2006) , Vanderkolk (2004) , FBI Agent Meagher (2001) and Wertheim (2000) , view comparison between latent and exemplar as an iterative process (going back and forth between latent and known print), a procedure that opens the examiner to bias. In practice, examiners we have heard in court and observed in training and casework frequently rely heavily on, or start from, the clearer exemplar print. The possibility of error arises from a confound: are the features in the latent discriminable (part of the uniqueness assumption) and is the examiner influenced by features visible in the exemplar?
We propose the following experiment: using a sample of 20 or more latent-exemplar pairs with known ground truth as to donor, two groups of randomly selected working latent print examiners are asked to compare each pair and state their conclusion. One group is given no further instructions. The other group is required to follow Ashbaugh's (1999) procedure, including a complete analysis of the latent and notation of indistinct or distorted features, before looking at the inked print. Comparison of the accuracy of the conclusions of the two groups would give an initial indication of the magnitude of error introduced by examiner interpretation.
We have not addressed the conditions under which features in a latent cannot be discriminated. One way to approach this question is to analyse examiner agreement about the presence of features as a function of the difficulty of the latent: impossible at present, given the absence of a metric of difficulty.
Not one of the six sources of error that affect the accuracy of fingerprint comparison conclusions has been studied in a way that permits a scientifically valid estimate of its magnitude.
Latent fingerprint examiners under Daubert
If latent fingerprint examiners (a) presented themselves in court as experiential experts rather than as scientific experts, (b) presented their conclusions as opinions rather than certainties and (c) based their opinions on individual training and experience rather than on an infallible (or nearly infallible) method, we would concur with Mnookin that the kinds of validation experiments we propose are unnecessary.
So long as fingerprint examiners claim a scientific status for their ACE-V work product, assert perfect or near-perfect accuracy and fail to provide evidence of validity, standardized training, adequate proficiency testings and quality controls, we and other scientists will continue to ask the courts to exclude fingerprint comparison conclusions until evidence of their accuracy is scientifically demonstrated.
